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THE RETREAT FROM 
OIL NATIONALISM IN ECUADOR, 1976-1983 
Introduction 
Since 1974 foreign participation in Ecuador's oil industry has been mini-
mal, with exploration left almost entirely in the hands of Cepe, the 
young and inexperienced state oil company. Although a large number of 
companies, attracted by the 'fabulous concessions' then on offer, had 
entered Ecuador in the 1960s, most decided to leave after the seizure 
of power in 1972 by a radical faction of the military. With the start-up of 
production from the country's new fields in the Oriente coinciding with 
the rise in world oil prices, the new regime of General Rodriguez Lara, 
anxious to reap the full benefits of the impending bonanza in oil earnings, 
had moved quickly to implement major reforms to Ecuador's oil regu-
lations. Following implementation of the 1971 Hydrocarbons Law, which 
enabled the state to take back nearly 70% of the 6.5m ha — almost the 
entire area of the Oriente basin — then held by foreign companies, the 
government ordered companies to renegotiate their contracts. Most 
responded by pulling out. The only remaining operator of any signifi-
cance, Texaco-Gulf, was compelled to return most of its acreage, pay 
higher taxes and sell 25% of the consortium to Cepe. 
In the years following the collapse of the Lara regime — a brief sum-
mary of which is given on page 2 — successive governments, concerned 
at the rapid depletion in reserves, sought to break with the nationalist 
policies of the early 1970s in the hope of attracting the large-scale invest-
ment needed to revitalise the oil-based economy and the country's 
flagging oil industry. In fact it was not until 1982, when revisions were 
made to the Oil Law, that Ecuador's nationalist exploration policy was 
reversed and finally laid to rest. Throughout the previous six years the 
ability of first the conservative military junta and then the Roldos and 
Hurtado administrations to implement a bold, long-term oil strategy 
was continually hampered by many diverse factors, ranging from their 
own political weakness and constant wrangling with Congress to policy 
differences between the Oil Ministry and Cepe. These delays proved 
damaging not only to the economy but also to Ecuador's attempts to 
convince potential investors that it was no longer a 'difficult' country to 
deal with. 
The purpose of this paper is to identify the key factors underlying the 
change in the direction of Ecuador's oil policy after 1976 and then to 
focus on the failure of successive governments to devise new oil regu-
lations sufficiently attractive to persuade foreign oil companies to return. 
The Collapse of the Lara Regime: A Summary 
Cracks in the government's nationalist oil policy first began to appear 
in 1974 when world oil demand and prices fell. Against the background 
of a growing world oil glut, the bargaining relationship between the 
Ecuadorian authorities and Texaco-Gulf, which produced over 95% of 
the country's oil, shifted decisively in favour of the latter: 
If the Ecuadorian government could not market its oil, nationalisation was 
an empty threat. If the companies did not need Ecuador's oil supply, they 
could afford to threaten to pull out, while adding to the pressure by cutting 
back production.1 
In response to these pressures the government dismissed the radical Oil 
Minister Captain Gustavo Jarrfn Ampudia in October 1974 and dropped 
his plans for a 51% state share in Texaco-Gulf. After Jarrin's dismissal 
the consortium initiated an export and investment boycott to force the 
government to reduce its tax burden and to make oil sales to the internal 
market more profitable by increasing domestic oil prices. 
The slump in oil revenue that resulted — in the first six months of 1975 
oil exports were down to $213m (from $430m during the same period in 
1974) — led to a mounting budget deficit, a growing balance of payments 
deficit and an upsurge in popular unrest. In an attempt to alleviate the 
growing economic and political crisis and yet at the same time avoid 
'selling out' to the consortium, President Rodriguez Lara tried to secure 
a large OPEC loan at the Algiers Conference. Once it became clear 
that this attempt had failed, the government had no choice but to find 
a domestic solution to the collapse in oil exports. The head of Cepe, 
Colonel Rene Vargas, argued in April that nationalisation was the only 
solution, but this was rejected by Oil Minister Luis Salazar, who claimed 
that Cepe lacked both the capital and the technology to take over 
the consortium's operations. With the OPEC loan unforthcoming and 
nationalisation ruled out for the moment, the government eventually 
decided in July 1975 to cut the tax on the export of crude from 58.58% 
to 53.04%, thereby reducing the cost per barrel by 43 c from $10.84 to 
$10.41. By taking this action the authorities hoped that Ecuador's oil 
would become more competitive in the world market and that Texaco-
Gulf would end its investment and export boycott and increase the level 
of production from 165,000 b/d to 210,000 b/d. In the event oil exports 
were normalised, but the investment boycott was to remain in force until 
further tax and cost reductions were forthcoming. 
As the government braced itself for another company offensive, oppo-
sition to the government intensified. In September there was a coup 
attempt by right-wing officers which, although unsuccessful, highlighted 
Lara's increasing inability to maintain institutional unity. In an effort 
to strengthen its position, the government initially eschewed repression, 
preferring instead to offer concessions to the (largely conservative) 
opposition forces. The government's actions, however, were interpreted 
as a sign, not of goodwill, but of weakness, and so the opposition — ably 
supported by the reactionary media — stepped up their attacks on the 
regime. Eventually, against the background of strikes and political unrest, 
Lara was ordered to resign by the three service chiefs on 10 January 1976 
and was replaced by a new military junta headed by Admiral Poveda. 
The Defeat of the Oil Nationalists 
The coup signalled the start of a major change in the direction of the 
country's oil policies, with the new junta anxious to break with the 
nationalist policies of its predecessor and move oil policy in a more neo-
liberal direction. Two of the key factors in this process have been the 
political structure and the economy. 
The growing political ascendancy of conservative groups and the 
corresponding decline in the fortunes of the military radicals was re-
flected in the composition of the junta, with all three members of the 
Supreme Council of Government, Admiral Poveda, General Luis Leora 
and General Duran — who emerged as the 'pivotal' figure in the govern-
ment — on the right of the political spectrum, though Duran initially 
sought to create a 'progressive' image for himself. Frequent Cabinet 
reshuffles throughout the year further strengthened the conservative 
orientation of the government, particularly at the end of 1976 when 
economic policy was placed in the hands of Santiago Sevilla, a member 
of the right-wing 'Union Republicana Democratica' and admirer of 
the Pinochet regime who was also, along with the future Oil Minister 
General Semblantes, an habitue 
of the Sunday morning 'polo club1 at Quito's exclusive La Carolina race-
course...and...closely linked with...business groups, and particularly with press 
magnate Antonio Granda Centeno....2 
Despite the clear shift to the right that the coup represented, the con-
tinued influence of the nationalist faction within the armed forces com-
pelled the junta to bring into the Cabinet a number of military radicals, 
including Colonel Oliveiro Vasconez, who was appointed Minister of 
Agriculture, and Colonel Richelieu Levoyer, who replaced the conserva-
tive General Ruben Davio Ayala at the Ministry of Interior. The most 
significant appointment was that of Colonel Vargas, the former Cepe 
manager, whose nationalist approach to oil mirrored that of his close 
friend Gustavo Jarrin. 
At the time of his appointment to the Ministry of Natural Resources, 
Texaco-Gulf had begun to increase pressure on the government to grant 
further tax reductions. As a condition for remaining in Ecuador and 
resuming investment, the consortium demanded a 50 c reduction on 
the state take for each barrel exported and a further reduction of 55 c 
before the company resumed investment in the exploration sector. 
Company executives sought to justify these demands by arguing that, 
at $10.81, Ecuador's crude was uncompetitive in the US market, though 
this was a questionable claim since Cepe had succeeded earlier in the 
year in selling lm barrels of crude from its 25% share of production to an 
American company, Phillips Bros. Pan-American, at $11.60 pb. Vargas 
responded to these demands by publishing in March 1976 his own plans 
fo r t he coun t ry ' s oil indust ry in Petroleo: desarrollo y seguridad. H e 
dismissed the consortium's request for a $1.05 tax reduction as absurd, 
claiming that government acceptance of this demand would be tanta-
mount to subsidising the companies to the tune of $51.7m a year. Vargas 
then argued that, since the companies had failed either to make the 
investment necessary to maintain existing production levels or to invest 
in exploration work, steps should immediately be taken to nationalise 
the consortium, with compensation being paid over a ten-year period at 
the book value price of $244m. In the meantime Cepe's role in the oil 
industry should be rapidly expanded. 
The government itself found the idea of nationalisation distasteful but 
because of the delicate balance of forces within the military it could not 
afford, at this stage, to alienate the nationalist faction and therefore 
preferred to stay aloof from the ensuing controversy. Not surprisingly, 
Vargas's article aroused fury amongst not only the oil companies but also 
the media which continually derided his proposals, arguing — with some 
truth — that Cepe was inefficient and lacked the technical and organ-
isational capacity to assume total control of the industry. In this respect a 
report issued in May 1976 by the Instituto Ecuatoriano de Normalization, 
which sets the technical standards for industry, proved extremely em-
barrassing to oil nationalists, since its claim that the valves used by 
Cepe were unsafe came just two weeks before the state company was 
scheduled to take over the internal distribution of all oil derivatives. 
The anti-Cepe campaign was not confined to the media, with bomb 
attacks in August on Cepe's headquarters in Quito and at the offices 
of a French firm, Boygess-Offshore, which was then holding negotiations 
with Cepe. 
The position of the radicals within the government, meanwhile, was 
being steadily undermined. A major blow to the nationalist cause came 
in June when Colonel Levoyer, a close ally of Vargas, was 'transferred' 
to a military attache post in Washington. His removal was greeted with 
ill-concealed delight by the oil companies and their media allies, since 
Levoyer had earlier published documents purporting to prove that, to 
finance the media campaign against Cepe, 
$280,000 had been given by Texaco to the deputy editor of the Guayaquil 
newspaper Expreso who had the job of distributing the money among other 
publications and political organisations.3 
Although Vargas himself was becoming isolated, the junta was not 
yet sufficiently secure politically to remove him. With little political 
support in the country as a whole and with 'a group of progressive army 
colonels...making its influence felt in the political arena',4 any sharp 
rupture with its predecessor's nationalist oil policies had to be ruled out 
by the junta. With his position secure for the moment, Vargas pressed on 
quickly with his radical policies, and on 6 June Cepe completed its much 
publicised (and criticised) takeover of the internal distribution of petrol, 
motor fuel, kerosene, diesel oil and marine oil. Not unexpectedly, a spate 
of pipeline 'breakages' — these had an uncanny habit of occurring at the 
most inopportune moments for the government — swiftly followed, 
causing oil production to fall sharply. The resulting petrol shortage was 
further aggravated when an oil tanker — 'quite deliberately', according to 
the authorities — rammed a pier at Guayaquil harbour. 
The most important event during this period was Gulf Oil's decision 
to leave Ecuador. It had been known for some time that the company 
was unhappy with its operations in Ecuador, claiming that the govern-
ment had prevented it from earning a reasonable return on its invested 
capital — a mere 5% compared with the 15-20% it would have liked — 
by withholding taxes with regard to increased production costs; by failing to 
pay in full for Cepe's 25% stake; [and] by enforcing the delivery of oil for 
internal consumption at an uneconomic price.5 
Once it became clear that the government would not accede to the con-
sortium's demand for a $1.05 tax reduction, Gulf actively sought its own 
nationalisation, presumably in the belief that a well-compensated with-
drawal was the best way of recovering its investment. Although, after 
months of negotiations, an agreement was signed on 22 April 1977 which 
allowed Cepe to take possession of Gulf's 37.5% share of the consortium, 
differences remained over the value of Gulf's investments, but rather 
than sour what had otherwise been an amicable settlement both parties 
agreed to appoint an independent auditor — Deloittes — and abide by its 
valuation. To back up their good intentions both endorsed standby letters 
of credit to cover the disputed amount, totalling $40m. This long-running 
dispute was eventually settled in May 1979 with Deloittes placing a $33m 
price tag on the balance of Gulfs holdings, bringing the total settlement 
to $115m, which was only slightly lower than Gulfs original estimate. No 
doubt aware that oil companies outside Ecuador had been waiting to see 
how Gulf fared in this dispute, the government honoured the agreement 
and immediately paid Gulf in full. 
It should be said that the government had no enthusiasm for the 
nationalisation, which had been forced upon it by Gulf, and was anxious 
that the issue should not be 'politicised' to the advantage of the Left 
and transformed into a nation-wide call for the nationalisation of the 
remaining oil companies in Ecuador. For this reason the government 
banned a proposed 'march for the nationalisation of oil' in August and 
excluded Vargas from the negotiations over compensation terms. While 
the Oil Minister's demand that compensation be paid in 5-10 year bonds 
would clearly have found little favour with either Gulf or the govern-
ment, his exclusion was nevertheless a measure of the extent to which 
the conservatives had consolidated their influence within the government 
and the armed forces. Vargas' political fate was eventually sealed when 
Duran, who had previously been in favour of a nationalist oil policy, 
openly called for his removal from office in the hope of ingratiating 
himself with the country's economic elites whilst simultaneously elim-
inating a potentially dangerous political rival. On 8 February 1977 the 
government appointed the right-wing chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, 
General Jaime Semblantes Polanco, to the Ministry of Natural Resources 
and announced that Vargas was returning to military duties. While 
Vargas made his way to Chile to assume the position of military attache, 
the nationalist manager of Cepe, Colonel Luis Pineiros, was also 'dis-
missed' and appointed military attache to Bolivia. 
There is no doubt, then, that these dismissals occurred for political 
reasons and were designed to facilitate a shift towards a neo-liberal 
approach to oil policy. Indeed, the removal of Vargas on the same day 
as an official statement concerning the arrest of Cepe's marketing director 
Ramiro Estrella on bribery charges was timed to cause the maximum 
damage to his prestige and to the credibility of the nationalist, progressive 
line he represented in the armed forces. The military radicals were now, 
for all intents and purposes, a spent force. 
It had already become clear when negotiations began with Gulf in 1976 
that a major restructuring of the country's oil policy was being planned. 
Although it eventually took two years to resolve the disagreement over 
compensation terms, the government had initially tried to get swift and 
full compensation for Gulf. This was due as much to Sevilla's fear that 
refusal to meet Gulf's demands could undermine his whole economic 
strategy, the success of which was largely dependent on the goodwill 
of foreign banking institutions, as it was to the government's desire to 
reingratiate itself with foreign oil companies. Texaco-Gulfs export boy-
cott and the economic dislocation that followed had been sufficient in 
itself to convince the junta that extreme nationalism did not pay and that 
a more conservative oil policy was needed to maintain the level of exports 
and the flow of oil revenue. But the events of 1974-75 only partly explain 
the shift in the direction of the country's oil policy. Of more significance 
was the emergence of a number of disturbing developments within the 
country's oil industry which, since no new major alternative sources of 
income emerged, had potentially catastrophic consequences for both the 
economy and the political structure. 
The Oil Crisis, 1976-1979 
Since the price rises of 1972-73 oil has become the life blood of the econ-
omy. From representing just 8% of total export revenue in 1970-72 its 
share of exports in the following five years averaged 48.5%, with oil 
receipts averaging $457.2m a year. One survey estimated that during this 
period oil production generated 61bn sucres, 45bn of which went to the 
state. As a result of this massive influx of revenue, the economy grew in 
1972-77 at an average annual rate of 11.4%, local industry expanded 
rapidly and income per capita jumped from $597.3 to $1504 in 1982. The 
end of the oil boom, following the change in world market conditions and 
Texaco-Gulf's export and investment boycott, served not only to under-
mine the Lara regime, but to highlight how sensitive the economy had 
become to fluctuations in oil export levels. 
There was particular concern at the downward trend in crude export 
volumes and the resulting loss of huge quantities of potential revenue. 
After peaking at 195,100 b/d in 1973, export volume declined steadily, 
to 122,600 b/d in 1979. In percentage terms this represented a drop of 
36.2% in the proportion of oil production exported, from 93.4% to just 
57.2%. Part of the reason for this disturbing trend was the stagnant level 
of production. Although, for conservation reasons, the ceiling on pro-
duction levels had been set at 210,000 b/d in May 1974, actual production, 
though reaching 208,820 b/d (76.2m) in 1973, never approached this level 
until 1979 when new production from City Investings fields helped raise it 
to 214,200 b/d (78.2m). In the intervening period production slumped to 
160,960 b/d (58.7m) in 1975 following Texaco-Gulf's dispute with the 
government, but then recovered gradually, reaching 201,800 b/d (73.6m) 
in 1978. 
A more significant reason for the drop in crude export volume was the 
rapid growth in domestic oil consumption, which rose from 32,200 b/d in 
1974 to 67,100 b/d — almost 30% of total production — in 1979.6 The 
rapid growth in consumption — by about 15% pa during this period — 
was due to the expansion of the economy in general and the explosive 
growth of the automobile fleet in particular. Around 60% of domestic oil 
and derivatives was consumed by the transport sector which had seen a 
70% increase in the number of vehicles registered in 1975-79. A further 
29% of final energy consumption was smuggled into Peru and Colombia, 
where domestic oil prices were higher, or simply wasted. While Ecuador's 
domestic oil prices remained among the lowest in the world, there 
seemed little likelihood that the country's soaring rate of consumption 
could be brought under control. Since 1940 the price of the lowest grade 
gasoline (63 octane) had been pegged at 4 sucres (15 c) per gallon, while 
the price of higher grade (78 octane) was fixed in 1959 at 4.65 sucres 
(18 c). To halt the rising rate of consumption and thereby check the 
steady decline in the exportable surplus the introduction of more re-
alistic prices was clearly essential. Major price increases would not only 
eliminate smuggling and the irrational use of oil but they would also 
encourage the substitution of new energy sources by eliminating the 
artificial edge enjoyed by oil and oil-related products and, with increased 
investment in alternative sources of energy, help redress the balance 
between the distribution of energy resources (hydrosources accounted for 
78% of total resources, oil only 19%) and the structure of consumption 
(oil produced 54% of Ecuador's needs, hydroelectricity only 4%). It will 
later be shown that a more realistic pricing policy would also generate 
the internal savings needed to allow Cepe to carry out future explo-
ration work. Governments have regarded the reversal of the country's 
low pricing policy as essential but the political pressures against this have 
been overwhelming. In this respect Ecuador is no different from the rest 
of Latin America, where gasoline prices in particular 
are a major focal point for political unrest. Price increases involve opposition 
from a powerful urban lobby of professional drivers, car users and bus passen-
gers which contains just enough poor people to convey a populist appeal...7 
In the longer term, the future health of the country's oil industry 
and, by extension, the economy depended on the implementation of 
measures to stop the rapid depletion in reserves. As early as May 1975, 
Oil Minister Admiral Salazar was warning that, unless there were sig-
nificant additions to the country's estimated 1.5bn bis of reserves, the 
present levels of output could continue only until 1981. Although esti-
mates on the size of Ecuador's reserves (both actual and projected) 
differ, the steady downward trend shown in Table 2 is corroborated by 
the fall-off in exploration drilling in 1973-78, when only 27 wildcats were 
completed compared with 98 during the boom period of exploration in 
1967-72. Unless exploration were stepped up and new discoveries made, 
and until the soaring rate of consumption could be brought under control, 
Ecuador faced the humiliating prospect of becoming the first oil import-
ing member of OPEC. A report in The Times, which placed Ecuador's 
reserves in 1977 at 1.3bn bis, warned that 
consumption is rising sharply at an estimated rate of at least 14% annually. 
This means that unless additional petroleum resources are developed there will 
be sufficient reserves for only six years within a decade, requiring a drastic 
reduction in crude oil exports.
Ecuador's real problems, however, were not of '16 years' hence but 
rather of immediate liftings and the continued flow of oil revenue to 
maintain economic growth. During the junta's period of rule there were 
already signs that the economy was moving into recession, with growing 
deficits in the current and balance of payments accounts, a mounting 
budget deficit and GDP falling to 6.4% in 1977, and then to 5.8% in 
1979. That the economy was not in worse shape was due entirely to the 
highly favourable terms of trade for the country's traditional exports 
which in 1978 represented nearly 64% of total export revenue, an in-
crease of 15 percentage points over 1976. One particularly disturbing 
aspect of the country's economic situation was the growth in external 
indebtedness. When oil production and exports began falling, and with no 
significant price increases in 1974-79, the military had tried to maintain 
oil boom conditions by turning to foreign banks, all of which were willing 
to supply an OPEC member with loans. Although the military was able to 
maintain reasonably high growth rates, the jump in the country's debt 
burden from $241.5m in 1970 to $2.3bn in 1979 left the government with 
little room for manoeuvre save in the direction of austerity. 
The government, though agreed on the need to reverse the downward 
trend in the economy, was divided on the extent of the crisis facing the 
oil sector. A number of ministers were certainly pessimistic over the 
country's future as an oil exporter, with some even questioning whether 
Ecuador had any oil future to look forward to. In a speech delivered in 
1978 Finance Minister Juan Reyna predicted that, with the share of oil 
in total government revenue steadily shrinking, the state would soon 
have to rely on more traditional sources of income and foreign exchange, 
such as taxes and agricultural exports. The 'oil boom', he announced 
emphatically, was over: 
Ecuador has been evicted from the Garden of Eden. It is time to live in reality; 
to think of the future of Ecuador on the basis of traditional economic resources 
and to stop depending on oil; and to work more and pay more taxes.9 
These calls to 'do away' with the oil mentality that had permeated the 
country since 1972 were echoed by the General Manager of Banco 
Central, Dr. Rodrigo Espinosa, who argued that, with oil reserves dwin-
dling and production stagnant, the main impetus for economic growth 
would soon come exclusively from the agricultural and industrial sectors. 
Such gloomy predictions were not shared by the new Oil Minister, Jaime 
Semblantes, or by Texaco, whose manager for operations with Cepe, 
Rene Bucaram, publicly claimed that 
the oil boom is not over; it has not even started. There are many possibilities 
in the Oriente and the coast which ought to be explored, and that, in the worst 
of lucks, we shall triple reserves!10 
Both views contained an element of truth. Although reserves were 
indeed dwindling and not being substituted by discoveries in circum-
stances where domestic consumption was running out of control, oil 
prospects in Ecuador were undoubtedly good. Past performances alone 
suggested that significant amounts of oil could be found. During the peak 
period of exploration activity in 1967-72 almost 70% of exploratory wells 
proved successful, compared with just 20% in Venezuela, while in the 
USA a mere 2% of wells were found to contain more than 1 million 
barrels. Nor was Ecuador's problem a lack of drillable prospects since 
only a small part of the Oriente basin had been proved by drilling. In 
fact, the central problem confronting the junta was that, since very little 
exploration development or maintenance work had taken place following 
the departure of foreign oil companies and Texaco-Gulf's investment 
boycott in 1972, Ecuador's tiny proven deposit base was being steadily 
reduced by production without replenishment by new discoveries. In 
these circumstances the junta's first priority was to re-establish an ami-
cable relationship with Texaco that would lead to the company dropping 
its investment boycott. 
The Agreement with Texaco 
Unlike Gulf, Texaco had remained in Ecuador in the belief that, as a 
result of the political complexion of the new junta and the prevailing 
domestic and international oil situation, the major concessions it required 
for its investment boycott to be lifted would eventually be forthcoming. 
Texaco was not to be disappointed. In December the company signed a 
new agreement which committed Cepe and Texaco to investing $20.3m 
and $11.7m respectively in a programme which was to include geological 
surveys as well as the drilling of ten exploration wells (mostly in the 
Shushufindi field) and nine development wells, six of which were to be 
drilled in the Atacapi and Parahuacu fields. Three other structures — 
Eno, Vista and Ron — were also to be drilled and maintenance work, so 
badly neglected by Texaco since 1974, was to be carried out to increase 
output from the Auca, Sacha and Lago Agrio fields. Oil Ministry officials 
estimated that the agreement would increase reserves by 100m barrels 
and, through the additions of new fields and the uplifting of previously 
known ones, raise output to around 235,000 b/d. 
In the following year both parties agreed in principle to establish a new 
company, Petroamazonas, to help improve the administration of existing 
jungle fields and increase output and reserves by reconditioning deterio-
rating oil wells and drilling at precretacic levels. Secondary recovery work 
was also to be carried out on the major oil fields, particularly the Shushu-
findi field which contained an estimated 372m additional barrels of crude. 
Although it was hoped that the new company would begin operations in 
1979 this plan, along with the December agreement itself, fell victim to 
oil politics. 
The end of Texaco's investment boycott proved costly for Ecuador. 
Decree 285, which had entitled Cepe to receive 25% of authorised 
production — set at 210,000 b/d — and not 25% of actual production, was 
rescinded and made retroactive. This cost Cepe $230m since actual pro-
duction only averaged 177,500 b/d, way below the level of authorised 
production. Decree 287, which had established limits on the length of 
time that companies could hold on to (1) concession areas without carry-
ing out exploration work and (2) discovered structures without develop-
ing them, was rendered harmless. By the end of April 1976, the deadline 
for the decree's application, all areas under the control of Texaco-Gulf 
except the five structures under exploitation were to revert to the state. 
At Texaco's request it was decided that these areas would only revert to 
the state if the deadlines for the new annual work schedules were not 
respected. 
A further decision favourable to the American company was the 
introduction of a more flexible market-oriented pricing policy on exports. 
Before the agreement Cepe had been trying to sell its share of Oriente 
crude at state-set prices, which were increased from $12.75 to $13.90 in 
February 1977 in line with Ecuador's fellow OPEC members who had 
opted for a 10% increase at Doha in December 1976. Texaco, despite 
constant pressure from the government, refused to fall into line and 
continued to sell its share of crude at $10.80. Although some observers 
have suggested that the break with the state-set pricing system was a quid 
pro quo for Texaco's acceptance of the investment programme, it seems 
more likely that the abandonment of what had been an almost doctrinaire 
adherence to unrealistically high prices took place as a result of the 
serious marketing difficulties Ecuador was experiencing once cheaper 
Alaskan and North Sea oil began flowing into the US market. With 
exports falling from 140,000 b/d in June to 70,000 b/d in October the 
government had no choice but to abandon the official OPEC-oriented 
price and let it be set by supply and demand. 
Although this decision was mutually beneficial, it is less clear who 
benefited from the changes to the taxation system. The December agree-
ment stipulated that the state's share from Texaco's sales would be based 
in future on Cepe's sales price, which at that time was fixed at $12.97 pb. 
Based on this price — which was to be readjusted quarterly — the royalty 
to be levied was increased on 16 December 1977 from 17% to 18.57% 
while income tax rose by 15.89%, from 71.42% to 87.31%. Although 
Sevilla claimed this increased the government's share by 90 c, from $10.70 
to $11.60 pb, the former Oil Minister, Rear Admiral (rtd) Gustavo 
Jarrfn, argued that the agreement 
set taxes at an even lower rate than what was acceptable to Texaco, having a 
net effect of transferring $13m in unrealised taxes to Texaco.11 
Texaco's profits in 1977 were $1.35 pb, said Jarrin; only $0.95 pb, said 
Sevilla. The company itself considered the tax and royalty increases to be 
'substantial', but nevertheless still felt that the new terms provided it with 
a reasonable return on investment. 
Hostile reaction to the agreement was confined to a small but signifi-
cant group of hard-line nationalists headed by Jarrin, who described it as 
'the biggest Christmas present in the country's history' and advocated a 
return to a policy of full nationalisation and to posted prices that would 
reflect the OPEC rises of recent years.12 Most Ecuadorians opposed this 
line and even many nationalists, recognising the critical oil situation and 
Cepe's inability to carry out the necessary exploration and exploitation 
work on its own, accepted that the company's continued participation 
in Ecuador was, regrettably, essential. However, the absence of any 
concerted opposition to the agreement was no indication of the possible 
response that might accompany moves to secure the return of foreign oil 
companies to Ecuador. Renegotiating a contract with a company which 
had been operating in the country since 1967 was far less politically 
sensitive and risky than tampering with the 1971 Oil Law and offering 
more favourable terms to investors. Nevertheless, the junta initially 
appeared willing to risk the possible political dangers that could ac-
company the shift towards a more neo-liberal oil policy. Soon after 
becoming Oil Minister, Semblantes announced that, since Cepe 'is no 
longer able to undertake all the exploration required', steps were under 
way to grant 'attractive incentives' to potential oil investors.13 Few 
details were available at the time but it was generally assumed that the 
'incentives' involved major revisions to the 1971 Oil Law. 
Cepe: an Alternative to Foreign Investment? 
The adoption of a more neo-liberal approach to oil policy was also occur-
ring in other producing countries of the Third World which, like Ecuador, 
were becoming primarily concerned not with ownership but with the need 
to halt the rapid depletion of their reserves. Faced with the realisation 
that their own state oil companies lacked the financial and organisational 
capability to accomplish this task, a growing number of governments 
came to accept the near indispensability of private oil companies with 
their large capital resources, skilled management and sophisticated 
technical expertise. As a result, previous nationalist policies were re-
versed and oil policy swung in a direction favourable to foreign invest-
ment: in Latin America itself investment was invited back on a scale 
unknown since the 1920s. 
While conservatives and their media allies in Ecuador had undoubt-
edly been too ready in their campaign against the Lara regime's oil 
policies to criticise their own state company, the claim that Cepe was 
not a viable alternative to foreign oil companies was largely valid. 
Although Cepe had begun undertaking its own exploration work in 1977, 
its financial debility, together with its lack of national technicians and 
managerial resources, made it impossible for the company to mount an 
extensive exploration programme. In response to nationalist pressure 
its scope of operations had been rapidly expanded, thereby stretching 
already limited resources and leading Cepe into areas for which it was ill-
equipped. The period after Cepe's takeover of the internal distribution 
of oil derivatives in June 1976, for instance, was plagued by a series of 
petrol shortages. As a result of further shortages in September 1977, the 
company's technical director Guillermo Bixby was forced to resign. 
Cepe's rapid expansion led not only to severe organisational and 
technical problems but to mounting concern among conservatives and the 
private sector at the growing role of the state in the economy and the 
increasing share of oil revenue diverted to Cepe. In these circumstances 
measures designed to reduce Cepe's scope of operations were to be 
expected, given the political complexion of the new government and the 
subsequent demise of the military radicals. The new Oil Minister had 
reasons of his own for clipping Cepe's wings. If a sharp break with the 
nationalist policies of his predecessor was to be enacted, then steps to 
reduce Cepe's extensive influence in the oil industry were essential 
lest its power grow so large as to become unwieldy, preventing future govern-
ments from pursuing their own oil policies.14 
For organisational and political reasons, therefore, the government 
decided at the end of 1977 to remove from Cepe responsibility for dom-
estic sales, transportation and marketing, and announced that its partici-
pation in petrochemicals and other petroleum-related operations was no 
longer mandatory. 
The most pressing and seemingly insuperable factor inhibiting Cepe's 
ability to carry out an effective exploration programme was its lack of 
funds. As early as 1976, the head of Cepe was expressing concern over 
the company's ability to meet operational costs and keep up to date the 
payment of some projects under construction, let alone invest in explo-
ration and development work, research and other activities essential to 
ensure Ecuador's future as an oil exporter. In these circumstances the 
junta's decision, in response to conservative pressure, to reduce Cepe's 
share of the budget to 23.66% in July 1977 by subjecting its income to a 
17% royalty, dealt a severe blow to the company's already precarious 
financial position. It was estimated that the 8.5% of this royalty ear-
marked for the military alone would cut the company's income by $600m 
in 1979 and $1.13bn in 1980. 
A further blow to Cepe's finances came at the end of 1979 when, 
despite opposition from the company's management, its share of oil 
revenue was reduced from 24% to just 7% of external crude oil and 
derivative sales. Cepe's ability to finance capital projects was further 
restricted in 1980 by the government's decision to maintain the oil price 
used as the base for computing the company's share of oil revenue at 
$23.50 pb, even though world prices at the time were well over $30. The 
financially debilitating impact of these measures — one Cepe manager 
warned that the company faced a real possibility of going bankrupt — 
highlights how vulnerable a company which cannot count on internally-
generated funds for self-sufficiency is to political pressure. Cepe's own 
vulnerability was a direct consequence of the tight governmental controls 
on the price of oil products sold to domestic consumers. With oil sold on 
the local market for a small fraction of world prices, Cepe was unable to 
generate internally sufficient funds for investment in exploration and 
exploitation out of its sales. Official sources estimated that if the heavily 
subsidised oil products had been sold at cost* the price of 78 octane 
gasoline would have been 8.36 sucres per gallon in 1979 and 13.12 sucres 
in 1980, while a report by the Oil Ministry predicted that the oil deriva-
tive subsidy for the domestic market would be $525m in 1979, an increase 
of $225m over 1978. With income low and financial commitments high, 
therefore, Cepe had few capital resources left for exploration and 
development work. Even then it appears that much of Cepe's remaining 
finance was used inefficiently and wasted on 'political wells', that is, the 
drilling of 'wildcats' in fields discovered by foreign oil companies before 
1972 and the subsequent claim by Cepe that it had proven 'successful' in 
its exploration work. These fields are often small, of heavy crude and 
located far from the principal production centres. A leading oil expert in 
Ecuador, Julio Cesar Granja, went so far as to claim that 
90% of oil exploitation since 1973 has been carried out by Cepe at high cost, 
with negative economic consequences under a technical-economic balance 
sheet but positive results if the balance sheet takes into account the political 
publicity. . 
For the junta, the civilian administrations that followed and, increas-
ingly, many 'nationalists', the country's deteriorating oil situation coupled 
with Cepe's financial debility and lack of managerial and technical exper-
tise made the participation of the private oil companies essential to 
revitalise both the oil sector and the economy as a whole. There was a 
growing realisation that foreign oil companies were better equipped to 
tackle the task of discovering substantial quantities of oil than financially 
weak state oil companies like Cepe owing to the nature of oil exploration 
itself. Not only is oil costly to find and develop, particularly in Ecuador 
where the most promising areas for the location of oil tend to be either 
offshore or in remote, heavily forested onshore locations, but it is also 
extremely risky, with the failure to discover commercial amounts often 
leading to the loss of vast sums of investment. International oil companies 
can operate more successfully in this phase of operations as a result not 
only of their managerial and technical expertise but because, by operating 
in different parts of the world, failures in some projects can be com-
pensated by successes in others. Despite the optimistic claim by hard-line 
nationalists that Cepe represented a viable alternative to the private oil 
companies, the fact remained that 
*that is, the weighted average between the cost of the imported gasoline and the 
cost plus taxes of gasoline produced in Esmeraldas plus distribution charges. 
even if Ecuador had the financial resources to carry out its exploration pro-
gramme, the risk would be fairly high and costly for the country. That is, it 
would not be worth taking it on when there is a much more advantageous 
alternative if we accept the collaboration of risk capital from outside.16 
The economic and political costs that could be involved were graphi-
ally illustrated in 1982 in the scandal surrounding Cepe's contract with 
Termago' for offshore drilling in the Gulf of Guayaquil. Over $18m was 
invested in the first well but no commercial quantities of oil were found. 
Similar results were obtained from a second and third well, both of which 
consumed over $30m worth of investment. In the ensuing uproar the 
contract was rescinded and Oil Minister Eduardo Ortega ousted following 
a congressional censure vote in September. 
It was because major oil companies were more adequately placed than 
Cepe to carry out an effective exploration programme that the junta 
sought to persuade these companies to return, supplement the resources 
of Cepe and make the new discoveries of reserves in quantities sufficient 
to expand production to meet export and domestic requirements and 
ensure the country's oil future. 
The 1978 Oil Law 
In the event the junta's ability to devise 'incentives' sufficiently attractive 
to secure the return of foreign investment was severely constrained 
by political considerations. Despite its bold talk, the junta eventually 
proved unwilling to accept the political and pyschological risks that would 
inevitably accompany any sharp break with the country's nationalist past. 
Even after 1976 the populist appeal of oil nationalism continued to be a 
feature of contemporary Ecuador which no government could easily 
ignore, particularly one, like the junta, which had no political base of 
support. The continued influence of oil nationalists within Cepe, the 
military (especially the navy), labour organisations and the universities 
made it doubly difficult for the junta to take the necessary steps to restore 
investor confidence and devise oil regulations that were, at the very least, 
competitive with those existing in the rest of Latin America. For political 
reasons, therefore, the administration was compelled to perform a 
delicate balancing act when drawing up revisions to the 1971 Oil Law. 
Accord ing to Weekly Analysis, 
changes in oil policy which were too drastic could lead to attacks on the 
government from the left and nationalists who felt a sell-out had taken place. 
It was therefore necessary for Semblantes to preserve the present measure of 
control over the oil industry and participation in profits which were the plusses 
of the 'nationalistic' policy followed by his two predecessors.17 
The Oil Law of 1978 did contain a number of important concessions to 
oil companies. Although exploration and development work was to be 
carried out at the investor's expense, the contractor had the right to 
receive, once 'commercially exploitable hydrocarbons' had been dis-
covered, 
a volume of hydrocarbons enabling him to recover his investment, in adequate 
terms and with reasonable profit margins.18 
The hydrocarbons received as payment could not be used to cover 
domestic needs, though if such oil was required for this purpose it would 
be purchased by Cepe at international, not domestic prices. Companies 
were exempt from the payment of royalties, surface duties and entrance 
fees, and were no longer obliged to return equipment, machinery and 
installations to Cepe at the end of the exploration programme. The size 
of the area contractors could retain during the exploration period was 
doubled and the minimum investment required was reduced to one 
exploratory well per 100,000 ha, and 1000 sucres per hectare in each year 
in the first three years of the exploitation period. 
While these concessions were not inconsiderable, they did not, as 
Jarrfn later claimed, represent a 'sell-out' to the oil companies. Indeed, 
World Oil went so far as to argue that, while the junta and Semblantes 
may have genuinely desired the return of foreign investment, the law 
reflected 
a strong feeling within Cepe and in the Oil Ministry that foreign oil companies 
should be given their walking papers.19 
Apart from having to invest at least 10% of their net profits in Ecuador, 
either in their own businesses or those connected with other hydrocarbon 
activities, companies were required to pay yearly to the state after the 
start of the exploitation period an amount 'which shall depend on the 
production of the contract area' to fund energy research and develop-
ment. Within six months after the start of operations, companies had to 
ensure that at least 95% of labourers, 90% of administrative staff and 
75% of technical staff were native Ecuadorians. A further provision 
stipulated that a company which had entered into a contract for the 
exploration and exploitation of crude oil had no rights to any natural 
gas discovered. Additional contracts for the exploitation of gas could be 
signed, though only if the contractor had discovered what the law vaguely 
termed as 'commercially exploitable' fields. 
Overall, the practical effect of the new law would have been to increase 
the state's control over the oil industry. Not only would companies dis-
pose of less crude, since they would only be permitted to market the 
crude given as payment, but they would be unable to boycott crude sales 
as only Cepe would handle crude. Pressure against increases in the 
reference price or the level of taxes, so often occasions for conflict in 
the past, would also no longer be possible since companies would no 
longer be subject to them. While the revisions as they stood were clearly 
inadequate, oil investors delayed making any final judgment on the 
government's invitation to explore for oil until uncertainties surrounding 
the political complexion of the new civilian government, scheduled to 
replace the junta in August 1979, were resolved. 
The junta undoubtedly took a number of important steps to untie the 
nationalist knot that had gripped the country's oil industry since 1972. A 
reconciliation with Texaco had taken place, a more flexible market-
oriented pricing policy on exports introduced and the rapid expansion of 
Cepe checked and reversed. Some concessions were made to the oil com-
panies in the 1978 Oil Law but, for reasons already mentioned, the junta 
was unable to repudiate totally the nationalist policies of its predecessor 
and, as will be shown later, consequently failed to restore 'investor 
confidence' in Ecuador. When viewed from a wider political perspective, 
it is clear that this inability was the result of the junta's own political 
weakness and its overriding political priority of transferring power to an 
elected civilian government by 1979. Both factors combined to produce 
a regime whose chief concern was with orderly administration and the 
avoidance of any politically risky policy innovations or initiatives — 
and this would include a 'sell-out' to the oil companies — which could 
inflame the political situation and threaten the return to civilian rule. 
This was graphically illustrated by the junta's response to the rapid 
growth in domestic oil consumption. Early in 1978 the junta appeared to 
be preparing the population pyschologically for a major reversal in the 
country's low price policy, with government ministers continually warning 
of the dire economic consequences facing Ecuador if the soaring rate 
of consumption continued. Support for price increases came from the 
Federation of Gasoline and Diesel Distributors which wanted a higher 
margin per gallon for its associates, and the Quito Chamber of Com-
merce, whose president, Carlos Ponce — himself a car distributor — 
pressed for derivative prices to be increased to 10-12 sucres per gallon. 
Price rises would also, of course, have found favour with Texaco, which 
was forced to sell crude to Cepe at domestic prices. 
Some indication of the response the government might expect if major 
price increases were implemented came in April 1978 when transport 
fares rose by 40%. The ensuing violence left four dead and hundreds 
injured with order being restored by the army on 11 April after ten days 
of unrest. In the wake of these disturbances, plans for major oil price 
increases were shelved, and the junta contented itself with a series of 
measures designed to halt the rapid growth in vehicle imports which 
accounted for the vast bulk of the increase in cars in use from 82,000 to 
230,000 between 1970 and 1977. Although it was hoped that substantial 
tariff increases would have the indirect effect of slowing down the growth 
in gasoline consumption, these measures were a rather poor substitute for 
a major price increase, particularly since a number of multinationals 
were already planning to establish car plants within Ecuador. 
The Transition to Civilian Rule 
Despite the junta's efforts to side-step such politically risky policy initiat-
ives, the transition to civilian rule was not without its problems, particu-
larly after the victory of the centre-left ticket of Roldos and Hurtado in 
the first electoral round in April 1978. This unexpected result shook 
the oligarchy and the commercial elites who had assumed, after Assad 
Bucaram, the country's leading populist, was debarred from standing for 
the Presidency, that the junta would maintain a tight grip on the electoral 
process. Faced with the clear prospect of a reformist government being 
elected in 1979, conservative apprehension towards Jaime Roldos, the 
CFP's replacement candidate for his uncle Bucaram, and his radical 
Christian Democrat running mate Osvaldo Hurtado, was transformed 
into a fear that often bordered on hysteria, with powerful economic 
groups aided by the media initiating a campaign of psychological ter-
rorism, warning voters of the consequences if the 'dangerous radical' 
Roldos and 'closet Marxist' Hurtado were elected to power. Despite their 
claims that the people would be voting in a Marxist dictatorship, it is clear 
that their real fears centred on Roldos's oft-repeated election promise to 
end the oligarchy's days of 'backroom clique' politics, halt corruption and 
tax evasion, and increase the level of taxation on high income groups. 
In the growing political tension orchestrated by conservatives, right-
wing officers opposed to the return to civilian rule attempted to topple 
the junta in September 1978. Although the collapse of the coup in its 
formative stages confirmed that the bulk of the officer corps favoured 'el 
retorno' (the return process), General Duran's control of the strategi-
cally vital Galapagos armoured brigade in Riobamba and the continued 
existence of other golpista officers posed a potential threat to the junta. 
There was, in addition, still a possibility that in a more unstable political 
environment officer support for the return to democratic civilian rule 
could be undermined. With this thought in mind, right-wing elements 
conspired to raise the political temperature in November 1978 by as-
sassinating the unsuccessful candidate of the Alfarista Party, Abdon 
Calderon. Subsequent investigations revealed that the murder had been 
planned by the Minister of Government General Bolivar Jarrin, a close 
ally of Duran, his aide Major Jaime Hermosa and the national police 
chief, Colonel Alberto Villamarin Ortiz. Instead of plunging Ecuador 
into political turmoil, the murder and the ensuing scandal provoked a 
fierce reaction from all sections of society against those seeking to disrupt 
the return to civilian rule, and allowed the second — and final — round 
of elections to take place. 
Roldos's overwhelming victory in April 1979 over the centre-right 
candidate Duran Ballen and the remarkable collapse in support for the 
country's traditional parties marked a turning point in the history of 
Ecuador's political development. In place of the elitist cliques and 
populist caudillos that had dominated the political scene since independ-
ence there had now emerged, principally in the form of the CFP, 
Izquierda Democratica and a number of small left-wing parties, new 
forms of political organisation led by well-trained and well-educated 
professionals armed with comprehensive economic and political pro-
grammes and supported by large sections of the populace. Economic 
growth since the 1950s, together with the accompanying spread of liter-
acy, education, rural-urban migration and the emergence of an urban 
middle and lower class, had undoubtedly helped erode the political 
dominance of the oligarchy but it was essentially the oil boom that 
brought an end to the old political order and led to the election of a 
progressive middle-class President. 
The size of Roldos's victory — he won nearly 70% of the votes cast — 
reflected his success in winning the support of both the newly emerging 
middle class and the lower classes. Although the oil boom and the 
accompanying growth in local industry, commerce and bureaucracy had 
benefited the urban middle classes and accelerated their expansion, they 
regarded the prevailing political structure as an anachronism which served 
to maintain the interests of the oligarchy and frustrate the economic and 
political aspirations of their own, increasingly important, class. According 
to one observer of the political scene, 
many younger members of the growing middle class — lawyers, academics, 
progressive capitalists — found the existent political order inadequate to the 
needs of an expanding, gradually modernising economy. Consequently, [in 
1979] they looked for new political alternatives.20 
Far from regarding Roldos as a Marxist or radical, these groups saw him 
as representing the most progressive, modernising sector of Ecuador's 
professional and capitalist class and thus an obvious alternative to the old 
parties. 
Roldos also received overwhelming support from an increasingly politi-
cised lower class which had benefited little from the oil boom. Despite 
rapid economic expansion and the Lara regime's promise to effect major 
socio-economic reform, the period 1972-79 witnessed no radical reforms, 
no restructuring of the agrarian sector, no redistribution of income and 
no change in the economic and political power structure. Indeed, reports 
issued by Guayaquil University and Banco Central in 1977 showed that 
the socio-economic position of the lower classes had actually worsened. 
Rather than use the oil wealth to finance populist policies and agrarian 
reform, the military preferred to invest in large development projects 
such as hydro-electric schemes, oil refineries, infrastructural improve-
ments, pipelines and communications. The remaining revenue was chan-
nelled into the armed forces and government bureaucracy or simply 
squandered. In these circumstances, Roldos's emphasis during the elec-
tion on current, rather than capital, spending and on the need for a short-
term reactivation programme to improve socio-economic conditions was 
inevitably received enthusiastically by the mass of Ecuadorian people. 
With the demise of the old political order and with the state, rather 
than the oligarchy or commercial elites, now in control of the country's 
main source of income, Roldos had the opportunity to consolidate his 
electoral support by using the oil wealth to finance 'welfare politics' and 
semi-reformist policies. It was therefore likely that the shift away from oil 
nationalism begun by the junta would be continued if not accelerated 
under Roldos. While a military government which is not accountable to 
the electorate can afford to take a long-term view of economic develop-
ment and concentrate on building an infrastructure for future prosperity, 
an elected official has to show tangible results in the short-term to 
win electoral advantage. For democratic governments in oil-exporting 
countries, therefore, it is essential 
to buy, or at least to maintain political support by judicious public spending 
policies. Once these come to benefit the majority or even a large minority of 
the electorate it becomes crucial for any government to keep up the flow of 
revenue. Under such circumstances confrontational or overly ambitious oil 
policies are generally avoided.21 
The likelihood that the new government would continue the shift away 
from the nationalist oil policies of the early 1970s was reinforced by 
further gloomy forecasts on Ecuador's future as an oil exporter. One 
report issued by the Junta Nacional de Planificacion in late 1979 predicted 
that the proportion of oil production exported would fall to 37% by 1981 
and then to a mere 15% by 1982 unless immediate steps were taken to 
halt the soaring rate of domestic consumption. In the absence of sub-
stantial reserves being discovered, total production would decline steadily 
to 59m in 1984 and reserves would drop from 1.4bn to 909m bis between 
1979-84. 
Government Oil Policy: 1979-1981 
Not unexpectedly, therefore, the new government issued an early state-
ment on the necessity of opening the country's oil industry to foreign 
investment, and in December invited tenders for the exploitation of 
10m ha. Cepe officials claimed that the $995m project, which included 
drilling, exploration, production, offshore operations and the construc-
tion of refining and petroleum facilities, could increase the country's 
reserves by as much as 2.16bn bis. Company response to the tenders 
initially appeared promising, with the International Herald Tribune 
reporting in July 1980 that 
a number of foreign oil executives have been in and out of Quito in the past 
few months, indicating that the government may be drawing some of them 
back into exploration. 
Such optimistic claims proved to be misplaced. Indeed, in the meetings to 
which the Tribune referred the government was left in no doubt that the 
1978 revisions did not go far enough and that unless more substantial 
incentives were offered, and until investors could be convinced that the 
sanctity of contracts would be respected, no investment would be forth-
coming. In view of the strong competition among developing countries 
for foreign capital and expertise, and given oil company perceptions that 
Ecuador was a 'politically difficult' country to deal with, the new govern-
ment had to recognise that the 1978 oil amendments were wholly inad-
equate. In the late 1970s Ecuador represented just one of a number of 
investment opportunities available to oil companies in Latin America 
where many countries, including Peru, Argentina, Colombia, Brazil and 
Chile, were anxious to attract risk capital to replenish depleting reserves 
and were already revising their oil regulations accordingly. There were 
also numerous opportunities for investment in the North Sea, Alaska and 
South-East Asia, where geologically promising areas had already been 
discovered and where, in comparison with Ecuador and much of Latin 
America, the 'political risk' was seen as minimal. After their experiences 
during the oil market revolution of the early 1970s, when companies were 
either nationalised or forced to renegotiate contracts which increased 
the state's share in profits and severely curtailed the scope of company 
operations, there was great reluctance to invest in what may loosely be 
termed 'politically difficult' areas. When evaluating exploration oppor-
tunities it was no longer sufficient for a host government or company 
officials to assure management that a basin had good hydrocarbons 
potential, that contractual terms were acceptable and that fiscal terms 
permitted an adequate rate of return. Companies now had to be con-
vinced that the political environment was relatively stable and favourable 
and, more to the point, that the sanctity of contracts would be respected 
by the authorities and not be subjected to rapid, unexpected changes. 
In this respect Ecuador was poorly placed in its attempts to attract 
investment, with companies continually complaining that successive 
governments had been 
too haphazard and carefree in settling and enforcing the conditions attaching 
to their operations in Ecuador.23 
In fact, evidence of any degree of continuity and consistency in govern-
ment oil policy since 1976 has been conspicuously absent. Oil companies 
had, of course, been concerned by events earlier in the 1970s when the 
Ecuadorian government cancelled most foreign-held concessions, in-
creased taxes and purchased a majority share in Texaco-Gulf. But these 
measures were — at least in retrospect — largely understandable given 
the nationalist orientation of the Lara regime and the prevailing world oil 
market conditions. What puzzled and worried potential investors was that 
after 1976, when Ecuador was actively seeking by word and, as far as the 
political situation would allow, deed to attract foreign oil investment, its 
treatment of companies already operating in the country was at best 
inconsistent and unreliable, at worst downright antagonistic. Companies 
were particularly concerned by the long-standing record of discord 
between successive governments and companies operating in the Gulf of 
Guayaquil. 
Ever since the discovery of the rich Amistad gas fields in 1970-1972, 
offshore exploration and exploitation work had been dogged by disputes. 
In November 1972 the ADA concession was cancelled, with the govern-
ment alleging that irregularities had taken place when the concession was 
first granted in 1968. ADA responded by suing the government for $25m. 
When the North-West Oil Company later bid — successfully — for the 
concession, ADA brought out another suit claiming that the bid resulted 
from a breach of confidentiality involving a former ADA employee. 
Although the suit remained dormant, North-West soon found itself 
embroiled in another conflict, this time with the government, on the 
utilisation of the gas discovered. The original plan had been for an 
ammonia-urea plant to be built to process the gas into fertilizer, but the 
subsequent collapse in the world price of ammonia-urea made the project 
(at least in North-West's view) unprofitable. With the government 
remaining firmly committed to using the gas to develop the country's 
fertilizer industry North-West, claiming that its contract permitted it to 
cease operations if they became uneconomic, suspended all drilling and 
exploration work. The dispute continued for two years until, in late 1979, 
Cepe rescinded the contract, assumed all exploitation and drilling rights 
and took over the company's drilling equipment, machinery and vehicles. 
To many outside observers Cepe's behaviour in the two-year dispute 
merely served to confirm that, despite the neo-liberal rhetoric, Ecuador 
remained a difficult country to deal with. The weekly publication Busi-
ness Latin America, writing soon after Cepe's decision to rescind the 
contract, commented that 
the government's handling of the North-West dispute is a discouraging remind-
er to all companies of the contrariness that can sometimes surface in Ecuador-
ian policy-making, particularly where natural resources are concerned.24 
Texaco's own experience in Ecuador after 1976 did little to allay com-
pany concern. Amicable relations with the government had apparently 
been re-established in 1977, but Texaco's failure in the following three 
years to implement its share of the agreed investment programme high-
lighted its sense of insecurity and frustration with the conditions in which 
it was operating. Although Texaco consistently argued that oil production 
could be increased on the basis of known reserves, some observers were 
convinced that the company was deliberately avoiding major investments 
and aiming instead at the rapid depletion of its wells in the belief that 
its own future in Ecuador was, at best, unclear. According to Weekly 
Analysis, 
Texaco seems to feel that its days in Ecuador are numbered. Perhaps it is 
because mounting domestic consumption is causing a shrinkage of the amount 
of oil the company takes for export. There is no profit in oil sold for domestic 
consumption. Perhaps the company believes that politics will require its 
complete fade-out in a few years. 
Although Texaco finally agreed in 1980 to carry out its share of invest-
ment, Dan Archer, the head of the company's operations at Lago Agrio, 
has since made no attempt to hide his concern with the attitude of the 
authorities: 
You come in and spend money on exploration and development, and then the 
government says 'we'll tell you what you get'. [In 1981] the net profit was 
equal to the revenue from one day's production.2 
Oil companies placed much of the blame for the ambiguous and often 
contradictory nature of Ecuador's oil policies on Cepe which, despite 
having its wings clipped by the junta, continued to exercise a significant 
degree of influence on the oil policy-making process. One company 
official recounted how, after receiving an encouraging visit from one Oil 
Minister, a team had flown to Quito at his request to analyse in detail the 
possibilities for investment. From the reception that the team received on 
its arrival it was clear that the company was not welcome. The official was 
convinced that the Oil Minister had been rebuked by Cepe on his return 
to Ecuador and told that no further talks should take place.27 There is 
certainly no doubt that relations between the government and the Oil 
Ministry on the one hand and Cepe on the other have been far from 
cordial, particularly after 1979. The rapid turnover in personnel that 
resulted — between August 1979 and the end of 1983 there were five Oil 
Ministers and five Cepe managers — not only harmed Cepe's operational 
capability but also hindered the government's ability to initiate and 
implement a long-term oil policy and left companies puzzled as to who in 
Ecuador was in charge of oil policy. 
The tension that surfaced when the junta reduced Cepe's share of 
budget allocations and its scope of operations became particularly acute 
during Roldos's period of office, with the principal sources of conflict 
centring on the role of Cepe, its relationship with the Oil Ministry and 
the terms on which foreign oil companies were to return to Ecuador. 
Dr. Mauricio Davalos, the new Oil Minister and member of the Demo-
cratic Party, believed that Cepe should be tied more closely to his own 
Ministry, that its operations should be confined to refining and market-
ing, and that exploration and exploitation work should largely be carried 
out by foreign companies. On the other hand, the new Cepe manager, 
Jose Carvajal, in the tradition of previous managers, sought a more 
ambitious and independent course for the company and adopted a more 
lukewarm attitude to foreign oil investment, arguing that, with increased 
budget allocations, Cepe itself could carry out much of the work needed 
to increase reserves substantially. His announcements (usually prema-
ture) of major 'oil finds' by Cepe — the Tena field for instance — ap-
peared to confirm that he did not regard the return of foreign investment 
with the same urgency as the government. At one stage Carvajal even 
accused the government of deliberately exaggerating the oil crisis in order 
to prepare the way for the return of the oil companies. 
Cesar Robalino's appointment to the Oil Ministry in place of Corsino 
Cardenas, who resigned for unclear reasons six weeks after taking over 
from Davalos, brought into sharp focus the conflict between Cepe and 
the government. Since becoming manager Carvajal had 
strived to invest the manager of Cepe with the prerogatives to conduct wide-
ranging oil policy matters. It was he who negotiated with Texaco; it was Cepe 
who was to deal with the foreign oil companies...it was Cepe who was to have 
the louder voice in Petroamazonas.28 
And yet during his term as Cepe manager no contracts were signed and 
little headway was made towards the creation of Petroamazonas, clear 
evidence in Robalino's view that Carvajal never intended making pro-
gress on either of these matters. In view of this, and as part of a con-
tinuing government effort to tie Cepe more closely to the Oil Ministry, 
Robalino assumed many of the functions previously exercised by Cepe, 
including the negotiations with Texaco and the drawing up of new risk 
contracts. In October 1980 Carvajal, bereft of Cabinet support and now 
out of favour with Roldos, was dismissed and replaced by the President's 
private secretary Xavier Vidal Mason who, though quick to confirm that 
overall responsibility for oil policy would lie with the government and not 
with Cepe, resigned eight months later in protest at the government's 
decision to reduce production from 228,000 b/d to 217,000 b/d in line with 
OPEC policy, and was replaced by Jorge Pareja Cucalon. 
Carvajal himself was convinced that he had been removed because the 
government regarded him as an obstacle to its policy of offering easier 
terms to the oil companies. After his dismissal, Carvajal warned that 
the nationalistic policy he espoused is to be laid aside in favour of another 
of easier terms for multinationals and more opportunity for local wheeler-
dealers.29 
Even without Carvajal as manager of Cepe, however, progress in the area 
of oil policy would have been difficult given the government's weak 
position within Congress. Despite Roldos's overwhelming victory at the 
polls, his ability to rule was continually hampered by Congress and its 
president Assad Bucaram who, having formed an alliance with the CFPs 
ideological enemy the Conservative Party, was determined to settle old 
scores with his one-time protege. Although the CFP had planned that 
Roldos would be a mere 'figurehead' President with real political power 
being exercised by Bucaram, his independent stance, highlighted by 
his choice of Hurtado as his running-mate, antagonised his uncle and 
eventually led to a complete rupture between the two men. Once Roldos 
had taken office, Bucaram, armed with a working majority, sought to 
punish his nephew by sending inflationary and economically embarrassing 
projects for executive decision and by throwing out, delaying or water-
ing down bills submitted by Roldos. In these circumstances, little that 
required the approval of both the Executive and the Legislature, includ-
ing the revision of the Oil Law and the creation of Petroamazonas, had 
much chance of being accomplished. 
Following Carvajal's removal, Robalino adopted a more urgent ap-
proach to the country's oil problems. In a speech delivered on 13 March 
1981 he pointed out that since 1972 exploration had been at a standstill, 
production had declined and reserves had fallen from 1.5bn bis to lbn, 
barely enough at the present production rate of 76m bis a year to cover 
Ecuador's oil needs for more than 12 years. Since Cepe lacked the 
resources to boost reserves, Ecuador had no choice but to rely on foreign 
investment. It was essential, therefore, to offer more attractive incentives 
to potential investors and to convince companies 
with a proven record to finance and conduct exploration onshore and off...that 
Ecuador is no longer a difficult country to deal with. What matters to foreign 
oil companies is net profits and we shall be competitive on that score.30 
To this end Robalino proposed a number of revisions to the Oil Law. 
The key amendments provided for a graduated income tax depending on 
the size of the reserves discovered, ranging from 48% for reserves of 
up to 100m bis to 89% for reserves of more than 1.5bn bis; a new risk 
contract with compensation in US dollars for the cost of discovering 
deposits; and an arrangement giving producers preferential purchasing 
rights to obtain crude from Cepe at international prices. A spokesman 
with the Oil Ministry insisted that these revisions would enable companies 
to earn a rate of return of 20-30%, though this claim was viewed with 
some scepticism by oil companies. Donald Kiefer, who coordinated 
negotiations for Mobil's exploration units, was unimpressed. In the third 
week of April he and representatives of four other companies met with 
Robalino to discuss the reforms. Clearly disappointed by what he had 
heard, Kiefer left the meeting claiming that Mobil still needed some 
'positive reason' to invest in Ecuador, though he added that the company 
would 'wait and see what comes out of Parliament' before passing any 
final judgment.31 
It was to be a long 'wait'. Following the submission of these pro-
posals to the National Chamber of Representatives on 9 April 1981, it 
was decided that the 'Comision Legislativa de lo Economico, Agrario, 
Industrial y Comercial', headed by Arg. Hugo Caicedo Andino, should 
invite the country's different political, economic and academic sectors to 
present their views on the proposals, the country's oil crisis and the need 
for foreign oil investment. In response to those critical of this decision, 
the Commission argued that the legal, political and economic implications 
of the government's proposals were of such importance that discussion 
of the issue could not, as in the past, be confined to a small clique of 
government officials and oil experts whose judgments had, more often 
than not, been viewed with distrust by the people and by the very oil 
companies the country was now seeking to attract. 
That some may have felt a sense of frustration at the decision to carry 
out a comprehensive survey of national opinions was hardly surprising 
given the almost continuous delays to which the implementation of 
energy initiatives had been subjected since 1979. Unable to obtain a 
stable congressional majority, Roldos found himself under attack during 
the first twelve months of his rule by the Bucaram-led Congress which 
constantly sought to undermine his authority by sabotaging, blocking or 
delaying any economic, political or energy proposals emanating from the 
Presidential Palace. Although Roldos obtained majority support for the 
election of Raul Carbo as Congressional President against Bucaram in 
August 1980, the vote was so close that he remained, until his death in 
May 1981, beholden to constantly shifting alliances in a Congress whose 
primary interest remained focused on political exercises rather than the 
pressing task of formulating and implementing the necessary measures to 
revitalise the oil sector and the economy. The situation changed little 
under the new President, Osvaldo Hurtado, whose ability to rule was 
similarly constrained by a Congress characterised by rampant oppor-
tunism and rapid changes of political allegiance. That Hurtado and not 
Roldos did eventually prove successful in obtaining Congressional sup-
port for reforms to the country's oil regulations was largely due to the 
different economic and political conditions existing during their periods 
of office. 
The circumstances under which the Roldos government was attempting 
to implement its energy strategy were hardly likely to help concentrate 
the minds of Congress and society as a whole on the country's oil crisis 
and the urgent need to lure foreign companies back to Ecuador. Indeed, 
it is likely that some officials felt that the change in world oil market 
conditions would enable Ecuador to adopt a tougher negotiating stance 
with potential investors. After six years of relatively stagnant oil prices, 
the country experienced a second oil boom following the Iranian Revol-
ution and the outbreak of the Gulf War. With fears of an oil shortage 
leading to an undisciplined scramble for supplies, OPEC countries were 
able to treble their official selling prices in 1979-80. In Ecuador the record 
crude price of $13.15 pb at the end of 1976 faded into insignificance as 
prices jumped to around $40 pb. With the start-up of production from 
City Investings fields raising production by 6% to 78.2m (214,200 b/d), 
the highest level since 1972, and Cepe's decision to take its 18.5% royalty 
from Texaco in oil (15,000 b/d) rather than cash, Ecuador was well placed 
to take full advantage of the price rises. In 1979 crude export earnings 
jumped by 85% from $558m in 1978 to $l,032m and then increased by a 
further 35% in the following year to $l,394m, despite a 4.7% fall in 
production and the proportion of crude output available for export falling 
to 54%. The bonanza in oil earnings coincided with less sensational 
increases in traditional exports to leave trade surpluses of $54m and 
$302m in 1979 and 1980 respectively, compared with a deficit of $175m in 
1978. While the oil boom was insufficient to reverse the downward trend 
in the economy, it did nevertheless enable the government to maintain 
political peace by pursuing an economic policy characterised by rapid, 
officially protected industrialisation, high wages for the workers and all 
manner of incentives for employers. 
Government pronouncements on the extent of the country's oil crisis 
and the urgent need to secure the return of foreign oil companies were 
therefore viewed by many with some scepticism. The belief that the 
government might deliberately be 'exaggerating' the crisis, as Carvajal 
claimed, was further reinforced with the adoption by Cepe and Texaco 
of a more dynamic and, to a large extent, successful exploration and 
development programme. At the start of 1981 the Petroleum Economist 
wrote that the preceding 18 months had been 
one of the most productive discovery periods since the existing producing fields 
were found by Texaco and Gulf in the late 1960s.32 
Although Texaco's failure to fulfil its part of the 1977 agreement had led 
to suggestions that the company was planning to close down its oper-
ations, it became clear in 1980 that no immediate pull-out was being 
considered. According to Robalino, the government — its patience 
exhausted — decided to force Texaco to start secondary recovery work 
on the Sacha and Shushufindi fields by presenting the company with the 
choice of 
either going through its secondary recovery programme or negotiate the sale 
of its stock participation. Texaco decided on the former.7,3 
In the period immediately following this ultimatum, Texaco, in addition 
to the start of secondary recovery work, brought a number of fields onto 
stream, including the Culebra, Auca Sur and Yuca fields (which had an 
estimated maximum allowable output rate of 8,000 b/d) and in 1981 
completed its Yulebra discovery well. 
Cepe, with its share of budget allocations increased, similarly adopted 
a more dynamic exploration and development programme. In 1979-81 
Cepe discovered the Shuara, Shushuqui, Secoya and Charapa fields, 
which represented a combined productive capacity of 27,500 b/d, and 
the Sansahuari, Cuyaberio, Tetete-1 and Bermejo fields, which had a 
combined productive capacity of 19,000 b/d. As a result of these new oil 
finds, production in 1983 rose to a record level of 85.8m bis. With respect 
to future exploration and development work, Cepe committed itself in 
1981 to a four-year programme of investment in the North-East ($150m); 
in the Gulf of Guayaquil ($250m — $400m); in secondary recovery; in 
the South-East ($300m plus); in the precretacic Eastern zone ($8m per 
exploration well); and drilling in the Central East area. 
This spate of discoveries, which undoubtedly brought some respite 
to the oil crisis, helped foster a belief that, while it would be beneficial 
for the oil companies to return, there was less urgency attached to the 
attainment of this objective than the government claimed. But while 
Cepe's exploration during this period was reasonably successful to the 
extent that its resources permitted, it was nevertheless likely that reserves 
would increase only marginally since the traditional fields in the Amazon, 
particularly Lago Agrio and Sacha, were already showing signs of 
exhaustion. There was also a danger that, in the absence of substantial 
amounts of foreign investment, these discoveries would be developed 
slowly at a rate sufficient only to meet growing domestic demand and 
would therefore have no measurable effect on export levels. In the short 
term, however, Ecuador had little choice but to depend on Texaco and 
Cepe's exploration efforts to increase reserves. As the College of Econ-
omists in Quito noted in 1981, even if foreign investment were to make 
an early return to Ecuador there would be no measurable impact on 
reserves for a number of years: 
taking into account the fact that exploration takes time — between five and 
eight years — preceded by a negotiation stage before contracts are granted, 
then there is little likelihood that substantial improvements in the relation 
between production and oil reserves can be effected on the basis of new 
contracts by the end of the present decade.34 
Given the time-lags involved and the fact that Cepe's resources were 
already stretched to the limit, the government made the first of a number 
of approaches to the World Bank and the IADB for loans to fund explo-
ration and development work. Since extending its energy-lending policies 
in 1974 to include exploration and development, a number of Ecuador's 
neighbours had successfully approached the World Bank for funds. In 
1980, Petroperu and the Bolivian state oil company YPFB received $32m 
each for exploration drilling and both Colombia and Brazil have received 
finance for seismic surveys. Since making its first venture into exploration 
activity in 1980, when the Jamaican state company Petrojam received 
$23.5m towards a three-well onshore programme, the IADB has also 
been an active lender for surface exploration, funding seismic surveys for 
large offshore tracts in Colombia, Brazil and Peru. Ecuador has so far 
been less fortunate, with its requests for loans rejected on the grounds 
that it has failed to meet the Bank's required policy conditions. When 
the first approach was made to the World Bank in 1980, the government 
was told that a loan would be considered only once major improvements 
were made to the management and efficiency of Cepe and when a more 
realistic domestic pricing structure for gasoline and other oil products 
had been introduced. More evidence was also needed that the country's 
spiralling external debt would be brought under control. 
Under Roldos some steps at least were taken to reverse the country's 
low-price policy, despite violent opposition from students and the lower 
class who feared the impact that higher gasoline prices would have on 
transport fares. Even though fuel costs represented a fraction of total 
transportation costs, bus owners had warned that fares would be in-
creased by the same multiple if fuel prices were increased. Price increases 
were eventually implemented in January, though the extent of the rise — 
pump prices increased by a mere 5 to 15 sucres — suggested that Roldos 
was merely preparing the population psychologically for a major price 
reversal. Although the annual growth rate of consumption slowed in 1980 
to 10.3% compared with 14.3% in the preceding year, more substantial 
price increases were clearly essential if domestic consumption was to be 
brought under control. As a report by the Higher Energy Council in 
January 1981 indicated, 
the consumption of hydrocarbons has risen and continues to rise at an explos-
ive rate which leads one to forecast that if these present rates of consumption 
growth and the current production figures are maintained, Ecuador in a few 
years' time will be a net importer of petroleum.35 
The opportunity for more significant increases came a month after the 
Council's report when Roldos took advantage of the 'spirit of national 
unity' engendered by the conflict with Peru and tripled the price of gaso-
line and derivatives. Low octane gasoline was increased to 60 c, diesel 
fuel to 42 c and high octane gasoline to 80 c. Although the government 
tried to soften the blow by imposing a price freeze on a number of goods 
and services, violent clashes again broke out between police and students. 
As a result of these price increases the annual growth rate of gasoline 
consumption dropped between 1980 and 1981 from 11.1% to 2.4%. 
Substantial increases in the consumption of kerosene, residual fuels and 
distillate fuels, however, resulted in the overall rate of consumption rising 
by 11.8% in 1981, to 82,700 b/d. 
That further steps would be taken to meet the Bank's policy on prices 
was inevitable not only because of the continued growth in consumption 
but also because of the government's increasing need to introduce 
revenue-saving measures to meet a mounting liquidity crisis. Even before 
Roldos's death in May 1981 and his replacement by Hurtado there were 
clear signs that the second oil boom was coming to a close as the tight 
supply situation of 1979-80 gradually gave way to a growing oil glut in the 
face of world recession and long-term trends in energy conservation and 
substitution. The subsequent depression in demand and prices had major 
repercussions for the Ecuadorian economy, the political structure and the 
oil-making process. 
The 1982 Oil Law 
The impact of the changing market conditions on Ecuador's oil prices 
began to make itself felt at the start of 1981. After peaking at $40.07 pb 
in January the average sales price of Oriente crude (29.7° API) fell to 
$39.37 and $38.24 in February and March respectively, and then in April 
to $36.2, $2 below the level on which government revenues for the year 
had been based. OPEC's belated decision to reduce its official market 
price from $36 to $34 pb did little to alleviate Cepe's increasingly acute 
marketing problems. With over six million barrels of unsold oil in its 
storage tanks, Cepe was forced to suspend production on 22 April for two 
days. Nevertheless, prices remained high enough for the rest of the year 
to push oil earnings up by 11.9%, from $1394m in 1980 to $1560m in 
1981. It was at the start of 1982 that the full impact of the changed 
market conditions hit Ecuador, with oil exports falling in the first 45 days 
by 28% on the same period in 1981 to $134m. OPEC's attempt in March 
to maintain the $34 price level and its share of a shrinking market by 
announcing a production cutback and introducing a production quota 
system proved ineffective and left weaker members like Ecuador with 
little option but to 'cheat' on prices by resorting to 'hidden discounts' 
or on production by signing throughput agreements with refiners which 
would allow exports to appear as products rather than crude oil. Cepe 
was one of the first OPEC members to take the controversial step of 
selling oil at discount to alleviate marketing problems. On 3 May 1982, 
Cesar Guerra, director-general of the Oil Ministry, publicly admitted 
that Cepe had sold 1.8m bis in the previous week at an average price of 
$32.20. A further breach in OPEC's efforts to maintain a united front on 
prices came just two months later when Cepe cut its oil price by $1.75 pb 
from $34.25 to $32.50 after pressure from long-term buyers in the USA. 
The sharp fall in oil prices, together with the continued decline in the 
proportion of oil output exported — in 1982 this represented a mere 
42.8% (90,100 b/d) of the 210,300 bis of crude produced daily — and 
weak prices for the country's traditional exports, were little short of 
disastrous for Ecuador. Crude export revenue, which represented 60% 
of the country's export earnings, fell by 11.0% to $1388.3m while total 
exports dropped by over 8% to $2343m. Between 1981 and 1982 GDP fell 
from 4.3% to 2%, monetary reserves slumped by 65% to just $210m, 
equivalent to less than one month of imports, and the current account 
deficit rose 18% to $1.18bn. By the last quarter of 1982, servicing on the 
$6bn external debt represented 122% of the value of Ecuador's export of 
goods and services, while nearly 25% of the budget for the year was 
allocated to debt servicing. In an attempt to alleviate the country's 
liquidity crisis, Hurtado followed his decision to sell oil at 'discount' 
by introducing an economic stabilisation programme which included a 
32% devaluation of the sucre, the abandonment of numerous capital 
projects — many of which had been planned on the World Bank's 
assumption that oil prices would rise by 3% in 1981 — major cutbacks in 
public spending and restrictions on imports. In October, against the 
background of growing social unrest, Hurtado introduced an austerity 
package that included the doubling of gasoline prices, the removal of the 
wheat subsidy and a 53% increase in bread prices. Further measures were 
taken to deal with the balance of payments situation in 1983 after agree-
ment was reached with the IMF and commercial bankers for a $170m 
one-year standby credit, the refinancing of part of the $6.5bn debt and 
new credit facilities. These included a 21% devaluation of the sucre in 
March, a 2% increase in commercial interest rates to 16% and a further 
package of austerity measures and import restrictions. 
In terms of the government's plans to effect a speedy revision of 
the Oil Law, the deterioration in the economic and political situation 
helped erase any lingering doubts on the extent of the crisis facing the oil 
industry and the wisdom of luring foreign companies back to Ecuador. 
This was reflected in the evidence presented to the Economic Commis-
sion. With oil income forming over 60% of export revenue, 20% of the 
state budget and a sizeable proportion of the budgets of Cepe, Inecel, the 
universities, and numerous other organisations including the Consejos 
Provinciates, Banco Ecuatoriano de Desarrollo, Junta de Defensa Na-
cional and Municipalidades, there was general agreement among the 
participants in the survey that unless consumption was cut, the steady 
decline in export volume of oil exported halted, and new reserves found, 
the country would be plunged into economic and political chaos. One 
leading oil expert, Edgar Garrido, warned that if reserves continued to 
decline by 7% a year and the annual consumption growth rate remained 
at 15%, by 1987 Ecuador would be forced to import 40-50,000 b/d 
(20m bis a year) to meet domestic needs. Calculated at the February 
1981 price of $38.4 pb this would represent a cost to the state of $770m 
(19,400m sucres). This figure is clearly too low, since it fails to take into 
account that the oil purchased at international prices would be sold at the 
lower, domestic prices and that the import requirement would rise with 
each succeeding year to meet rising domestic demand. 
To tackle the problem of rising consumption, the Commission recom-
mended the raising of domestic prices, the electrification of urban and 
interprovincial transport and a fundamental shift away from oil towards 
alternative sources of energy, principally hydroelectricity but also solar 
energy and biomass. With respect to reserves, another oil expert, Wilson 
Pastor, estimated that 450-700m bis, representing over $l,000m worth of 
investment, needed to be found between 1981 and 1986 — a task clearly 
beyond the capabilities of Cepe. In these circumstances there was general 
agreement that Ecuador had to draw up new oil regulations which were at 
least competitive with those of other countries — and this would have to 
include some type of production-sharing scheme — to attract investment 
from both state and private oil companies. 
The changes to the Tax Law advocated by the government were 
considered by the Permanent Legislative Commission for the Budget 
which presented its own proposals on 24 June 1982. According to the 
Budget Commission's President, Wilfredo Lucero, these contained a 
number of incentives, 
one of which is to make the contracting companies subject to the general regu-
lations of the Tax Law, thus enabling them to avail themselves of tax credit, 
eliminating at the same time double taxation for which they are liable under 
the present law.36 
The Commission also proposed an additional, progressive tax, based 
on the level of production from the wells discovered (though crude oils 
of less than 15° API discovered were to be excluded from this tax), 
with the tax payable to be calculated by Cepe on the basis of official 
monthly production reports. The tax itself would not be deductible for 
the purposes of tax calculation. 
On 6 August 1982, following the Economic and Budget Commission's 
submissions and against the background of a growing political and 
economic crisis, Congressional approval for reforms to the country's oil 
regulations was finally obtained. In the preamble to the 1982 Hydro-
carbons Law it was stated that new terms and conditions 'in line with 
the most up-to-date and progressive of their kind currently applicable 
to the petroleum industry' were needed to induce both private and state 
companies to invest in Ecuador to revitalise exploration activity and 
thereby ensure the country's future economic and social development. 
The package of incentives was based on a type of risk contract. Under 
this system the contractor is reimbursed for his expenses and investments 
by Cepe in cash from the output of the fields in the contract area once 
'commercially exploitable' fields have been discovered. However, if 
the national interest is better served, payment can be made in oil or by 
a combination of cash and oil. Any payments in oil will only be made 
on part of the exportable balance of production from the contract area. 
If the contractor receives payment in cash he will have a preferential 
purchase option on up to 50% of the exportable balance. 
A maximum of two contracts can be signed, one of which must cover 
an offshore area of not more than 400,000 ha, and companies must 
commit themselves to a minimum annual investment of $120 and $180 per 
acre, for onshore and offshore contract areas respectively. Given the size 
of the blocks eventually tendered this means a minimum investment of 
$24m onshore and $72m offshore during the first three years of explo-
ration. The exploration period is four years, extendable by another two, 
and exploitation can last up to twenty years. 
The Budget Commission's main tax proposals were fully incorporated 
in the law with the tax increment — that is, the rate over and above the 
ordinary (maximum) income tax rate of 44.4% — tied to the volume of 
production and not, as the government had proposed, to the size of 
reserves. Tax is zero on production below 30,000 b/d, 3% at 30,000 b/d, 
plus 1% for each additional 10,000 b/d up to a maximum of 30%. Oil of 
15° API or less is exempt from the production tax. There is also a Labour 
Participation fee of 15% (in effect a royalty) which is deductible before 
payment of income tax and a 1% research tax on after-tax income. 
Overall, the effect of these changes is to bring down the total tax paid 
from 87% to around 75%. 
Following Congressional approval for these amendments the govern-
ment immediately announced that new exploration contracts would 
be finalised by September. In the event, changes at the top in the Oil 
Ministry and Cepe meant that a further five months passed before the 
new model contracts were drawn up. Although Parejo's replacement at 
Cepe, Rear Admiral Raul Jaramillo, had a thorough grounding in the 
country's oil industry — he served as the military's representative on the 
Cepe board — the same could not be said for Gustavo Galinda, who took 
over the Oil Ministry following Ortega's dismissal. Unlike his prede-
cessor, Galinda, a civil engineer, was a novice in matters concerning oil. 
Delays, therefore, were bound to occur while he developed his know-
ledge of the oil industry and built up those personal contacts which are 
essential when doing business with outside investors. 
Once the new exploration contract had been drawn up, in February, 
Cepe set 17 October 1983 as the deadline for the submission of bids for 
exploration rights in 11 blocks, 7 of which were onshore. Although 25 
companies originally expressed firm interest, with a number of these, 
including Amoco and BP, purchasing the $50,000 information packages 
on both the onshore and offshore areas, the response was modest. By 
the close of bidding only 4 blocks, 2 in the Amazon and 2 offshore, 
drew bids. Belco of New York was the only bidder for two offshore 
areas immediately to the north of its Peruvian marine areas where it 
has been producing oil for about 20 years; the most popular block, 
number 15, which adjoins Texaco-Cepe's highly productive fields, 
drew competing bids from two consortiums, Conoco-Husky-Home and 
Idemitsu-Hispanoil, and from Occidental who finally won first option. 
Finally, Exxon and Hispanoil made a joint bid for Block B. Cepe officials 
were hoping that contracts would be signed sometime in August 1984. 
Although presidential elections were scheduled for the start of 1984, 
company spokesmen appeared satisfied that the contracts, once signed, 
would be respected by the new government. The government policy of 
offering exploration rights to foreign oil companies had widespread 
support among the political parties and those candidates with significant 
chances of electoral victory, including the two front-runners for the presi-
dency, Leon Febres Cordero and Rodrigo Borja. With the traditional 
export sector depressed by low prices and freak weather conditions and 
with oil representing nearly 70% of the country's total export revenue in 
1983, there was general acceptance that a major successful exploration 
effort was the only way to boost foreign earnings and revitalise the 
economy. The start-up of production from Cepe and Texaco's new fields 
in 1983 has undoubtedly had a dramatic impact, at least in the short-
term, on production and export levels. According to figures released by 
the Ministry of Natural Resources, production rose by 12% in 1983 to 
235,260 while crude exports increased by a staggering 54%, from 90,100 
b/d in 1982 to 139,200 b/d. However, although the rise in export volume 
helped compensate for the fall in oil prices — most of Cepe's sales 
contracts were signed at around $27-28.50 pb — and pushed crude export 
earnings up by 18% to $1644m, most observers recognised that, in the 
absence of substantial infusions of investment, Ecuador's production 
levels would start to fall after 1985. 
Although the political risk was therefore considered small by some 
companies, it would be surprising if Ecuador's somewhat acrimonious 
relationship with foreign companies in the past had not caused many 
potential investors to refrain from bidding for exploration rights. More 
recent events, notably Jaramillo's letter to Texaco announcing that 
Cepe wanted to become operator for the consortium by 1985, can only 
have increased doubts concerning Ecuador's stability in respect of foreign 
companies operating there, even though provision for such an arrange-
ment had been made in the original agreement. According to the Pet-
roleum Economist this letter was apparently written 'without the know-
ledge of either the energy minister or of the President'37 — further 
evidence of the confusion and inconsistencies that have long characterised 
Ecuador's oil-policy-making process. There were other reasons to account 
for what was a rather lukewarm response to the 11 blocks on offer. Some 
companies were undoubtedly disappointed by the new Oil Law and by 
the absence of any certainty that they would get access to the oil dis-
covered in their contract areas. No significant concession on this vital 
issue was made, with the law still allowing the state to keep a sizeable 
portion of the oil discovered, and limiting a foreign investor's access to 
cash profits rather than to crude supplies. Some company officials also 
expressed concern with the pricing concept on which cash payments were 
to be based since the valuation of the oil would be dependent on the 
'whim' of Cepe and its ability or otherwise to sell its oil on the world 
market at good prices. Similarly, in the event of payment in kind or the 
utilisation of the preferential purchase scheme, the price of oil was to be 
fixed in accordance with the average price obtained in the previous month 
by Cepe in its overseas sales. Companies were further disappointed to 
find that the provisions relating to gas deposits and the reinvestment of 
10% of profits remained intact. 8 
The competitive environment in which Ecuador was seeking to attract 
investment also undoubtedly accounted for company reluctance to bid 
for the blocks on offer. Mention has already been made of the numerous 
opportunities available to oil companies in countries where the legal 
and political environment was far more favourable for investment. In 
any case Ecuador, along with most other Latin American countries, 
has never been a prime target for oil investors, a fact highlighted by 
the future investment plans of US oil companies outlined in the 24th 
Annual McGraw-Hill Summary of Operations in 1982. Even though vast 
amounts of oil still have to be discovered — one influential paper, by 
Dr. B.F. Grossling of the United States Geological Service, concluded 
that recoverable reserves for Latin America could range from 490 to 
l,225bn barrels, compared with 74bn barrels so far discovered — the 
report predicted that capital spending in Latin America would rise only 
marginally in 1982 and then 'tail off sharply' in 1983-1984. Expenditure in 
Asia, on the other hand, would jump from $5bn to $13bn between 1982-
1984, with nearly half of all oil company foreign capital spending being 
channelled into Indonesia, Malaya, South-East Asian countries generally 
and China in particular. In Africa expenditure was expected to double in 
1982 to $3.4bn and thereafter flatten out at $3bn. 
Ecuador's ability to attract the substantial quantities of investment 
needed to bolster the country's flagging oil industry has been further 
weakened by the worldwide slump in oil prices which has forced com-
panies to reassess investment plans. With profits being squeezed com-
panies have tried to alleviate their severe cash flow problems by reducing 
capital expenditure, thereby necessitating more selectivity in their choice 
of exploration ventures. While priority investment targets in Asia, North 
America and China are unlikely to suffer, the price declines have reduced 
the attraction of committing limited finance to developing high-cost fields 
in regions noted for political instability and thrown doubt on the com-
mercial viability of marginal ventures. As the recent experiences of 
Ecuador's neighbours have shown, liberal oil regulations and good hydro-
carbons potential are not, under current market conditions, sufficient 
to maintain, let alone attract, investment. After the drilling of a record 
73 wildcats in 1982 exploration activity in Colombia has fallen sharply 
despite a number of highly promising discoveries by Occidental in the 
Llanos. One industry source predicted that it could fall by as much as 50-
60%.39 The changed market conditions have similarly slowed the 
momentum of exploration activity in Peru with a number of prospective 
deals with investors falling through during 1983. Earlier in the year 
Occidental announced a two-thirds reduction in drilling plans for the 
jungle and cancelled all drilling in the northwestern coastal fields. The 
reduced level of interest in Peru can hardly have anything to do with 
the country's oil regulations, which are extremely favourable to foreign 
investors. At the end of 1981, a spokesman for Occidental claimed that 
its Peruvian operations, though representing just 110,000 b/d, were the 
company's most profitable world-wide, owing to a production-sharing 
scheme that yielded better returns than, for instance, Libya and the 
North Sea.40 
Cepe's continuing efforts meanwhile to obtain funds from the World 
Bank and the IADB have still proved fruitless. Despite the hefty in-
creases in October 1982 in gasoline prices — Regular (63 octane) rose 
to 20 sucres (60 c), Extra (80-84 octane) to 30 sucres (90 c) and Super, 
the highest grade, to 40 sucres ($1.21) per gallon — the devaluations 
of May 1982 and March 1983, import restrictions, the removal of the 
wheat subsidy and a de facto moratorium on debt Bank officials have yet 
to advance any loans. In further negotiations in 1982 the World Bank 
demanded further revenue-saving measures and expressed concern that, 
despite its recent successes, Cepe still suffered from serious managerial 
and technical deficiencies. Whether there will be any funds available for 
exploration and development work once Ecuador fully meets the required 
policy conditions is open to doubt. Since President Reagan's election in 
1980 both the World Bank and the IADB have been under increasing 
pressure to change their lending policies following a National Petroleum 
Council Report, commissioned by the US Energy Secretary, which 
claimed (though no supporting evidence was produced) that these policies 
'were competing directly' with private oil companies in exploration and 
development ventures. Both Banks, it argued, should therefore confine 
their lending activities to infrastructural development projects though the 
NPC did acknowledge that they may have a 'legitimate' role in aiding 
pipeline, marketing and distribution efforts and in some cases perhaps 
taking on an advisory role on exploration. 
It is not clear at this stage what effect this pressure will have, though 
since the USA is the main contributor of finance to both Banks, a fall-off 
in the amount of funds available for oil and gas development is a real 
possibility. There has already been a sharp fall-off in IADB energy-
related lending since the peak level of $l,000m in 1981, with approved 
loans to this sector falling to $797m in 1982. Loans for oil and gas projects 
meanwhile fell from $147m to $134m, the latter representing one loan to 
Bolivia for an exploration and production project. Although energy-
related lending rose by 21% in 1983 to $968m, loans approved to the 
petroleum sector slumped to $21.6m, their lowest level for four years. 
Postscript 
Quito's apparent satisfaction with the response to the 11 blocks on offer 
is understandable in view of the depressed state of the world oil industry 
and the competitive environment in which Ecuador was seeking large-
scale investment. Nevertheless, the fact remains that, without more 
substantial quantities of investment, Ecuador's oil industry (and econ-
omy) faces an uncertain, and probably short, future. According to official 
estimates released at the end of 1983, total recuperable (proven) reserves 
stand at l . lbn bis: with output averaging 254,000 b/d in the first half of 
1984 this would suggest a reserve/production ratio of just 12 years. The 
new government of Leon Febres Cordero, which took office in August, 
will have to consider ways of offering more attractive terms to potential 
investors. Already many other Third World countries, recognising that 
further incentives are required to secure a share of shrinking investment 
funds, have sought to make their oil regulations more palatable to oil 
companies. Lower taxes and an increased company share in production 
are the two most obvious steps Ecuador could take to compensate for 
the decline in demand and prices and the depletion of cash investment. 
Perhaps a new risk contract could even contain a share in development 
costs. Whatever form the revisions may take, it is essential that their 
implementation not be hindered by any repetition of the delays that 
severely hampered the adoption of oil policy initiatives between 1976 and 
1982. While the government delays matching the incentives being offered 
elsewhere, prospective investors can be expected to channel their limited 
funds to other parts of the Third World where terms are more favourable. 
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STATISTICAL APPENDIX 
Table 1: Key Petroleum Indicators ('000 bpd) 
Output Crude Exports Consumption % increase 
over previous 
year 
1973 208.8 195.1(93.4) 29.3 10.6 
1974 177.0 164.1(92.7) 32.2 10.0 
1975 160.9 145.8(90.6) 38.4 19.3 
1976 187.8 167.6(89.2) 44.7 16.4 
1977 183.4 138.2(75.4) 53.3 19.2 
1978 201.8 122.7(60.8) 58.7 10.1 
1979 214.2 122.6(57.2) 67.1 14.3 
1980 204.1 110.2(54.0) 74.0 10.3 
1981 211.1 105.5(50.0) 82.7 11.8 
1982 210.3 90.1(42.8) 83.1 0.5 
1983 235.2 139.2(59.2) N/A N/A 
N/A: not available at time of writing (mid-1984). 
S o u r c e : OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin, 1983. 
Note: The figures in parentheses represent the proportion of output 
available for export. 
Table 2: Proven Reserves (in billion barrels) 
(1) (2) 
1974 2.50 1.46 
1975 2.45 1.40 
1976 1.70 1.34 
1977 1.64 1.27 
1978 1.17 1.10 
1979 1.10 1.03 
1980 1.10 1.03 
1981 0.85 1.00 
Sources: (1) Oil and Gas Journal and World Oil. (2) World Bank. 
Table 3: Oil Export Earnings (in $ million) 
Total Crude oil % share of Refined 
Exports Exports total exports Exports 
1977 1401 651 46.5 11 
1978 1529 558 36.5 91 
1979 2151 1032 48.0 146 
1980 2544 1394 54.8 193 
1981 2544 1560 61.3 167 
1982 2343 1388 59.2 136 
1983 2363 1644 69.6 106 
Source: Banco Central. 
Table 4: Domestic Oil Consumption (in '000 b/d) 
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
Gasoline 20.5 23.1 26.1 29.0 29.7 30.1 
Kerosene 7.0 8.0 7.6 7.5 9.0 9.2 
Distillate Fuels 11.9 12.8 15.0 16.8 17.9 18.0 
Residual Fuels 9.2 11.6 14.0 15.5 20.4 19.5 
Other 4.7 3.2 4.4 5.2 5.7 6.3 
TOTAL 53.3 58.7 67.1 74.0 82.7 83.1 
Source: OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin, 1983. 
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